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1 Introduction
Recently, active institutional investors and shareholder activists have sharply criticized
various features of stock option programs. They argue that the design of many stock
option programs is an example of managerial self-dealing and rent-extraction and finally
illustrates the inability of existing corporate governance mechanisms in monitoring exec-
utives. At the same time, there is increasing criticism in the academic literature saying
that both the escalation and the design of stock option compensation reflect managerial
rent-seeking rather than optimal contracting. Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004) and Be-
bchuk et al. (2002), for example, argue that managers exercise their influence to maximize
wealth transfers with stock options. In their view, executive compensation reflects agency
problems rather than solving them and weak corporate governance structures lead to an
inefficient design of stock options. Bebchuk and Fried as well as Bebckuk et al. argue
that several features of stock option plans like no indexing to market movements, exer-
cise prices that equal market prices at grant dates and option repricing activity can be
seen as evidence consistent with this kind of rent-seeking.1 They claim that the greater
a manager’s power (i.e. the weaker the governance system), the greater his ability to ex-
tract rents by influencing executive pay (the so-called managerial power approach).2 The
problem of managerial rent-seeking is known for quite a long time as a quote from Shleifer
and Vishny (1997) in their often cited survey on corporate governance shows: “The more
serious problem with high powered incentive contracts is that they create enormous op-
portunities for self-dealing for the managers, especially if these contracts are negotiated
with poorly motivated boards of directors rather than with large shareholders.”3
It is well documented that managers possess significant control rights and that they use
their discretion in firms to benefit themselves personally in various ways (by expropriat-
ing funds, empire building, consumption of perquisites, no cash-out of free cash flow, and
by entrenching themselves in positions that make it difficult to displace them when they
1See also Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) for an exposition of a contracting view vis-a-vis a skimming view of executive
compensation.
2Hall and Murphy (2003) contradict this hypothesis by claiming that managerial rent-extraction provides, at best, an
explanation for the compensation of top executives. They believe that governance structures have improved in the past
preventing the extraction of rents by corporate officers.
3Shleifer and Vishny (1997), p. 745.
2
perform badly).4 Moreover, there is no doubt that managers have at least some influence
on the level, structure, and design of their compensation packages. As pointed out by
Murphy (1999), the process in which the structure and design of compensation schemes
is developed is likely to be exposed to managerial power. Usually, initial recommenda-
tions for incentive plans are developed by the internal human resources departments and
not by independent advisors.5 Moreover, compensation recommendations often need the
approval of top managers before being passed to the compensation committee. Managers
can therefore influence proposals in their own interests.
Following this line of argument, Ryan and Wiggins (2004) state that recent empirical
research “... suggests that the process of determining compensation is better described
as a negotiation process between the board and the CEO” rather than by an optimal
contracting approach.6 It is therefore evident to ask to what extend the design of stock
option programs is determined by variables influencing this bargaining process. We can
think of variables such as the structure and composition of the board, the existence of
blockholders or differences in legal regimes. Existing research has not provided an answer
to this question yet. So far, we do not know whether the design of employee stock option
(ESO) programs is indeed affected by blockholders or by the structure and composition
of the board of directors.
Recent research in the field of corporate finance suggests that inside board members,
large boards, busy chairmen or the absence of large blockholders result in less effective
monitoring and in weak corporate governance.7 Based on this work, we want to inves-
tigate in our study whether there exists a significant association between the design of
employee stock option programs and the structure of a firm’s corporate governance. We
try to explain the observed variation in the design of ESO programs with differences in
the corporate governance schemes of firms. Simply put, we examine whether firms with
weak governance structures have stock option programs that are poorly designed from an
economic/agency theoretic point of view.
4See Jensen and Meckling (1976), Shleifer and Vishny (1989, 1997) or Jensen (1986).
5Even if outside compensation consultants are involved, it is unlikely that they work independently as their fees depend
on the mandates of the advised companies.
6Ryan and Wiggins (2004), p. 498.
7See Becht et al. (2003), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) or Holderness (2003) for surveys.
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To perform this task, data on European stock option programs provides a promising basis.
Due to accounting and tax regulations, the variation in the design of ESO programs for
U.S. firms is rather limited compared to European firms (see Pasternack and Rosenberg,
2003 or Murphy, 1999). U.S. firms, for example, usually do not use performance-based
ESO programs.8 Our data on European stock option plans therefore provides the unique
opportunity to test the importance of governance structures for the design of ESO pro-
grams. European stock option plans show large variations with respect to their design
features and hence provide a natural environment for an attempt to test the managerial
power approach described above.
We analyze the association between the ESO design and governance structures by using
detailed data on the option programs of 82 very large corporations belonging to the
DAX 30, the Euro Stoxx 50 and the Stoxx 50. Our data set includes information on
five core variables of the programs of these firms: on relative and absolute performance
requirements, on accounting treatments, participation structures, and on the transparency
of the programs. We combine this data set with hand-collected data on the governance
structures of the respective firms.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. We find that cross-sectionally, ownership
variables are related to the ESO design in a way that is consistent with the managerial
power view. When ownership concentration is low and the exposition to the U.S. capi-
tal market little, executives extract rents by designing poor ESO programs. This finding
supports the view that controlling shareholders are important in monitoring manage-
rial compensation and behavior. Our evidence on the role of blockholders complements
findings of related studies documenting that large shareholders play an active role in cor-
porate governance. Further support for our self-dealing view is provided by the finding
that firms with weaker creditor rights more often have badly designed stock option plans.
Our findings further suggest that ineffective board structures (insider-dominated boards)
are cross-sectionally related to the stock option design in a way that supports the argu-
ments expressed by shareholder activists and academics. More specifically, we find that a
higher percentage of outsiders is generally associated with better ESO programs.
8ESO Programs without performance conditions were treated preferably according to FASB accounting rules, see Bebchuk
et al. (2002).
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section surveys the literature that
links corporate governance, executive compensation, and self-dealing. Section 3 derives
benchmarks for the optimal design of stock option programs based on economic insights.
It further states the hypothesis we want to investigate empirically. Section 4 presents
our data sets and variables, and provides an exposition of the empirical methodology
employed. Section 5 documents our empirical results on the design of the studied option
programs and its relationship to corporate governance structures. It also presents an
interpretation and discussion of our results. The last section summarizes the main findings
and concludes.
2 Related Literature on Self-Dealing and Executive Compensa-
tion
Several empirical papers have examined the relation between corporate governance struc-
tures and various aspects of executive compensation.
Some studies have examined whether there is an association between the level of compen-
sation and governance structures. Core et al. (1999), for example, use a sample with CEO
compensation data of 205 publicly traded U.S. firms. They examine the relation between
corporate governance (proxied by board and ownership variables) and CEO compensation
to test whether CEOs earn greater compensation when corporate governance structures
are less effective. Controlling for economic determinants of compensation, they find that
the level of CEO pay is increasing in board size, the percentage of outsiders who are gray
(outsiders that receive money from the company in excess of the board pay), the percent-
age of outside directors who are over age 69, and the percentage of outsiders who serve
on three or more boards. Moreover, they find that chief executive compensation is lower
if the CEO does not serve as the board chair, if he holds a larger fraction of company
stock, and if there exists an external blockholder who owns at least 5%. Overall, Core
et al. conclude that “... CEOs earn greater compensation when governance structures
are less effective.”9 Benz et al. (2001) document that managers raise their stock option
compensation in firms with weak governance structures and conclude that their findings
9Core et al. (1999), p. 371.
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are consistent with rent-seeking rather than optimal contracting.10
Lambert et al. (1993) also find support for what they call the “managerial-power model”.
Their findings suggest that CEOs get higher salaries when they have appointed a larger
fraction of the board members. The existence of a large external blockholder is negatively
related to the level of executive compensation. Lambert et al. argue that their “... results
provide support for the importance of managerial power in explaining levels of executive
compensation”.11 Supporting this view, Boyd (1994) finds that CEO salaries were lower
in corporations with higher levels of control.
Other empirical research examines whether corporate governance structures affect the
pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation. Hartzell and Starks (2003), for
example, find that institutional shareholding concentration and the pay-for-performance
sensitivity of executive compensation are strongly positively related. They show that for an
average executive, an increase of one standard deviation in the percentage of institutional
ownership by the five largest shareholders is associated with an estimated 20% increase in
the sensitivity of options to stock price changes. Additionally, they find that institutional
ownership concentration is negatively related to the overall level of compensation (after
controlling for economic determinants of the level of compensation). In a recent paper,
Ryan and Wiggins (2004) find that powerful CEOs use their position to influence the
compensation of directors in a way to provide fewer monitoring incentives. Furthermore,
they influence their own pay such that it becomes less sensitive to stock price changes.
Newman and Mozes (1999) provide additional evidence suggesting that observed com-
pensation practices are more likely to be consistent with managerial self-dealing than
with optimal contracting. They document that CEOs receive preferential treatment when
insiders are members of compensation committees. Harvey and Shrieves (2001) find a sig-
nificant relationship between ownership and board variables on the one hand and the use
of incentive compensation on the other hand: incentive compensation is more pronounced
in firms with a larger fraction of outsiders on the board and in firms where blockholders
are present.12 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001, 2002) find that “... better governed firms
10See Hanlon et al. (2003) for conflicting evidence.
11Lambert et al. (1993), p. 457.
12Similar results are provided by Mehran (1995). He examines the relationship between executive compensation structures
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pay their CEO less for luck” (windfall profits) and that CEOs in better governed firms
are charged more for the options they are given.13 Bertrand and Mullainathan conclude
that their results can not be explained with a simple contracting approach. They argue
that their findings are better explained by a view where CEOs exercise effective power
over the pay-setting process (which is consistent with the managerial power approach).
Further evidence for a relationship between compensation practices and governance struc-
tures is provided by Yermack (1997). He studies the timing of stock option grants and
finds that CEOs receive stock options shortly prior to the release of good news. Since
stock options are usually granted with a strike price equal to the stock price on the grant
date, CEOs effectively receive in-the-money options by making grants before good news.
Compensation and wealth hereby increase by reasons that are unrelated to managerial
ability, effort or performance. Moreover, he finds that the difference between the stock
price 30 days after grant and the strike price at the grant day is higher in firms with weaker
corporate governance. Similar evidence is provided by Aboody and Kasznik (2000).
Other studies have examined the association between ownership/board structures and
the repricing of stock options.14 Some authors provide evidence that option repricing re-
flects governance problems. Chance et al. (2000), for example, find that insider-dominated
boards are more likely to reprice stock options in a way that is favorable to managers
(which suggests managerial entrenchment and self-serving behavior). Similarly, Brenner
et al. (2000) show that the attendance of executives in the compensation committee in-
creases the likelihood of option repricing. Empirical evidence also suggests that managers
tend to time repricing decisions in order to increase option values. Callaghan et al. (2004)
document that this kind of timing is “... more likely in firms with weak corporate gover-
nance”.15
and ownership variables of 153 firms. Mehran finds that companies with more outside directors provide a higher fraction of
their executive compensation in an equity-based form.
13See Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), p. 901.
14Repricing means the lowering of strike prices of previously granted stock options that are significantly out-of-the-money.
The new strike prices are often 30-40% below the old ones (see Chidambaran and Prabhala, 2003). Note that the repricing
decision effectively transforms options with little value into options with considerable value.
15Callaghan et al. (2004), p. 1652. Contradicting evidence of no association between corporate governance schemes and
option repricing is provided by Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003) who study the relation between option repricing and
diffuse stock ownership as well as institutional ownership. Similarly, Carter and Lynch (2001) find no evidence that the
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The study that is most closely related to our work is a paper by Pasternack and Rosenberg
(2003). Using a sample of Finnish firms, they study determinants of the scope of ESO
plans, of exercise prices, target groups, and of dividend protection clauses. Their results
suggest that firms with bigger monitoring difficulties use more equity incentives.16 There
seems to be no association between their incentive measure and ownership structures.
Exercise prices of options and ownership variables also seem to be unrelated. Their results,
however, suggest that institutional ownership increases the likelihood that a broad-based
option plan is used. Pasternack and Rosenberg also show that the degree of foreign stock
owners reduces the likelihood of dividend protection mechanisms in ESO plans.
Our brief literature review shows that empirical evidence suggests that corporate gov-
ernance schemes and various aspects of executive compensation (such as the level of
compensation, its sensitivity to firm performance, the fraction of pay that is equity-based
as well as the process of option repricing) are related in a way that is consistent with
the managerial power approach.17 However, the relationship between the design of stock
option programs and governance structures is much less explored and also less conclu-
sive. The goal of our paper is to extend the existing literature by explicitly examining
the important link between corporate governance schemes and the design of stock option
programs.
3 Economic Recommendations and Hypothesis
Before turning to our predictions on the relationship between governance structures and
the design of ESO programs, we want to set forth what economics tells us about the “op-
timal” design of stock option programs. We take these economic insights as a benchmark
to evaluate the real ESO programs in our sample. Stock option programs evolved as a
solution (or at least a mitigation) of the agency problem that is caused by the separa-
likelihood of a repricing decision is related to governance problems.
16Option incentives are measured as the stock option overhang, i.e. the fraction of equity that is obtained if all granted
options are exercised.
17For more general expositions on related corporate governance issues, see La Porta et al. (1998, 1999), Shleifer and
Vishny (1986, 1997), Gompers et al. (2003), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Holderness, 2003, Weisbach (1988) or Becht et
al. (2003).
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tion of ownership and control.18 It is uncontroversial among academics that equity-based
compensation, if well designed, provides effective incentives to managers.
Agency theory predicts that managers should be awarded for outcomes over which they
have control, and which are informative about the actions they have taken (see Holmstro¨m,
1979, 1982). Stock prices do provide information about the actions taken by managers.
However, they are only noisy measures of executives performance. Efficient compensation
contracts should therefore filter out stock price changes that are due to general market
trends (windfall profits) and that are hence unrelated to managerial performance. From
an optimal contracting point of view, incentive pay should consequently be tied to the
performance relative to comparable firms or competitors and not to absolute performance
as such19 A relative performance evaluation can essentially be regarded as a way to remove
the noise of stock price movements (see Murphy, 1999). To filter out general industry
or market trends in practice, the vesting of stock options can be made dependent on
the meeting of specific relative performance targets.20 More specifically, a proper stock
option plan could be constructed such that options become exercisable if and only if the
stock price of the company outperforms a certain benchmark index consisting of main
competitors in the industry.21
A stock option plan without any absolute performance target is problematic as well.
Exercises gains by managers should depend on the firm obtaining at least some minimum
stock return that exceeds, for example, the risk-free rate of interest or the firm-specific cost
of capital. In the absence of any absolute return targets, managers might realize exercise
gains even though a stock investment in the firm did not outperform a risk-free investment.
Institutional investors and shareholder activists therefore regularly demand these kinds of
stock option programs that contain at least some absolute performance targets. If stock
option plans include such benchmarks, incentive effects naturally increase in the stock
18See Jensen and Meckling (1976).
19The so-called relative performance evaluation developed in Holmstro¨m (1982).
20Bebchuk and Fried (2003) call these kind of ESO programs “reduced-windfall” plans. As an alternative mechanism, one
can link the exercise prices of stock options to market or sector indexes to get a relative evaluation.
21In the U.S., most stock option plans fail to include relative performance targets or indexed exercise prices (see Bebchuk
and Fried, 2003). In Europe, this is different, as we will show below.
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return that is required.22 We can therefore conclude that a proper stock option plan
should typically include some absolute stock return thresholds that is required to be met
before options become exercisable.23
From an economic point of view, stock options constitute economic costs to the issuing
companies that should be expensed. The cost of a stock option is the amount an outside
investor would pay for the option at the date of grant, assuming that he shows exercise and
forfeiture patterns that are identical to those of inside employees. In practice, there used
to be no legal requirement for the accounting of stock option plans, and many firms were
reluctant to expense the costs of ESO programs in their accounts. Accounting Principles
Board (APB) Opinion 25, for example, ruled that firms that have set the strike price of
their options equal to the stock price at the date of grant, did not have to expense the
costs of their option programs at all. Instead, they were asked to disclose an estimate of
the value of the ESO program in a footnote. Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123,
issued in 1995, recommended that firms treat stock option programs as an accounting
expense and advised them to use the “fair market value” of options as an estimate for
the cost of an ESO plan. However, as FAS 123 provided firms with the choice to continue
reporting according to the older APB 25, only a number of firms actually adopted this
economically correct FAS approach (see Hall and Murphy, 2003).24
Several authors emphasize the economic importance of expensing employee stock options.
Guay et al. (2003), for example, argue that “... accounting should reflect the true costs of
doing business, and labor acquired through ESO grants is a real economic cost that firms
should deduct from earnings as an expense.”25 Moreover, they expose that accounting for
ESOs leads to a more efficient functioning of the economic system.26 Interestingly, Guay et
al. also link stock option accounting and corporate governance hypothesizing that better
22At least up to a certain point.
23As this argument is questionable from a pure agency theoretic point of view, we also performed our analysis in Section
5 with the exclusion of this design feature. It turned out that the results are robust to the inclusion/exclusion of an absolute
performance target in the analysis.
24From 2005 onwards, firms are required to expense the costs of stock options under IFRS 2 and US-GAAP.
25See Guay et al. (2003), p. 409.
26See Fields et al. (2001) for a survey on this issue.
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governed firms would be more likely to expense stock option.27 We can therefore conclude
that well governed firms should expense the costs of their ESO programs to reflect their
true costs of doing business.
Agency theory provides a rationale why it makes sense to link the compensation of top-
managers via stock options to company performance. It is, however, less clear why man-
agers at lower levels in a firm should also participate in costly stock option programs. On
an individual basis, lower-level employees usually have a significantly smaller impact on
firm performance compared to top-managers, and it is well known that stock prices are
much less informative about the actions takes by these individuals at lower levels in an
organization. Hall and Murphy (2003) therefore argue that “... it seems implausible that
stock options provide meaningful incentives to lower-level employees”.28 Using empirical
data, Oyer and Schaefer (2005) actually find that stock options for middle-level managers
are a very inefficient way of providing incentives.29 We follow this line of argument and
conclude that well-designed ESO plans should only include a limited number of employ-
ees (top-managers) whose efforts can have a significant impact on firm value and firm
performance.30
Finally, in the interest of a clear-cut evaluation of a firm’s compensation schemes by in-
vestors and shareholders, firms should follow a transparent communication strategy with
respect to their adopted ESO programs (full transparency in the proxy statements). Dis-
closures should include information on exercise prices, on the number of options granted
and held per director, on vesting conditions or on dilution effects. Information of this type
allows both shareholders and investors to critically assess the compensation schemes of
firms, their mechanics and incentive effects.
27Empirical evidence by Dechow et al. (1996) suggests that managers from firms that were lobbying against the FASB
drafts to expense the costs of options received both a higher total compensation and a higher fraction of compensation in
options.
28Hall and Murphy (2003), p. 58. Alternative measures of performance such as divisional profits therefore provide much
more efficient ways to boost incentives at these lower grades (see Bushman et al., 1995 and Ittner et al., 1997).
29They show that for the additional risk imposed on them, very high risk premia need to be paid to get an increase in
effort.
30See Oyer and Schaefer (2005), Zhang (2002) or Bergman and Jenter (2004) for arguments why firms might use broad-
based ESO plans.
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Our elaborations so far show that the precise form (rather than the pure existence) of
ESO contracts matters if options are used to motivate managers in an appropriate way.
The above recommendations provide benchmarks that enable us to investigate to what
extent the observed features of the stock option plans in our data set are consistent with
optimal contracting and agency theory.31
Based on the literature that studied the relationship between governance structures and
executive compensation and based on economic recommendations on the optimal ESO
program design, we can no formulate the hypothesis that we want to test empirically:
ESO Program Design = f(Corporate Governance V ariables, Control V ariables) (1)
i.e. we want to test whether the design of stock option programs and governance struc-
tures are related. Our null hypothesis is that firms with weaker corporate governance
structures have worse designed stock option programs (managerial power approach). Un-
der this null hypothesis, managers extract rents and behave opportunistically by designing
option programs that are inconsistent with the recommendations made by agency theory
if governance structures are ineffective and weak. We test our hypothesis cross-sectionally
using the data described in Subsection 4.1. The variables we use to measure the quality
of a firm’s governance structures are presented in Subsection 4.2. Finally, the econometric
specification employed to test our hypothesized relationship is described in Subsection
4.3.
4 Data Sets and Methodology
4.1 Data Sets
Our empirical analysis is based on the combination of three data sets. The first data set
consists of detailed information on ESO program characteristics of DAX 30, Euro Stoxx 50
and Stoxx 50 companies (ESO Data). It includes information on five core variables of the
ESO programs: relative and absolute performance targets, accounting treatments, partici-
pation structures, and transparency of the respective programs. The program information
31On how we operationalize these suggestions, see Subsection 4.2.
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is based on 20-F filings and a mail survey that was conducted by Union Investment, the
third largest mutual fund manager in Germany. The second data set includes detailed
information on the corporate governance structures of DAX 30, Euro Stoxx 50 and Stoxx
50 firms (Corporate Governance Data). It contains information on various ownership vari-
ables (listings and ownership structures), on board variables (structure, size, fraction of
outsiders, age and mandates of the chairman) as well as on legal variables (legal system
and creditor rights). The information is based on hand-collected data from 20-F filings
and annual proxy statements. A third data set comprises information on control variables
like Tobin’s Q or leverage. The source of data for the latter variables is Datastream. The
year of observation is 2003.
Our combined initial data set consists of 89 firms. Seven firms were dropped because
they abandoned or stopped their stock option programs in 2003. Three more firms were
excluded in the subsequent regression analysis because of missing data. The final sample
used for studying our research question therefore consists of 79 corporations.
4.2 Measurement of Variables
ESO Data: For each company j and for each of the five ESO design variables i = 1, ..., 5,
we construct a subindex that grades the arrangement of the respective variable. The grade
of program variable i of company j is denoted as Gij. We grade a company’s entire ESO
program by grading each of the five program features. To evaluate a firm’s stock option
program, we use the predictions and suggestions made by economic theory. The better
the grade, i.e. the smaller the figure of the subindex, the more consistent is the program
feature with recommendations derived and presented in Section 3. Having graded each of
the five program features, we construct an overall ESO Grade Gj by aggregating the five
subindexes into an overall index (see below).
Relative Performance Target G1j is a variable that measures to what extent the vesting
of options in the ESO program of firm j depends on the meeting of specific relative
performance targets. It takes the value G1j = 1 or 2 if the relative performance target
is a company specific benchmark (like the average performance of major competitors),
G1j = 3 or 4 if it is a standard market index (e.g. the Euro Stoxx 50), and G1j = 5 if
13
no benchmark exists at all.32 If a non-standard benchmark exists, the grade depends on
an individual evaluation. Absolute Performance Target G2j is a variable that measures
the absolute stock return that is required before options become exercisable. It takes the
value G2j = 1 if the absolute performance target is larger than 8% p.a., G2j = 2 if it
is between 6% and 8% p.a., G2j = 3 if it is between 4% and 6% p.a., G2j = 4 if it is
between 2% and 4% p.a., and G2j = 5 if it is smaller than 2% p.a.
33 Accounting reflects to
what extent a firm expenses the economic costs of its stock option program. The variable
takes the value G3j = 1 if a fair value accounting approach is used by firm j (like IFRS
2 or SFAS 123), G3j = 2 if the intrinsic value is expensed, G3j = 3 or 4 if the APB 25
methodology is used (disclosure in the footnote only), and G3j = 5 if the stock option
program is dilutive (no disclosure or expense at all). Participation Structure G4j depicts
the broadness of a firm’s stock option plan. It takes the value G4j = 1 if the program
is well defined and of small size, G5j = 2 if it is of medium size, and G5j = 3 if it is
very vague and very broad-based. Transparency G5j reflects the transparency of the ESO
plan of firm j and to what extent an external evaluation of the ESO plan is possible. It
takes the value G5j = 1 if the program is very transparent to shareholders and investors,
G5j = 2 if it is only partly transparent, and G5j = 3 if it severely lacks transparency (no
information on the number of granted options, no data on dilution effects, etc.).34
Having graded each of the five program features, we evaluate the overall design of the
stock option program of firm j by aggregating the grades of the subindexes into a firm-
specific overall ESO Grade Index (abbreviated Gj). The construction of this index is
straightforward and follows the methodology employed in Gompers et al. (2003): for
each firm we add the grades of the subindexes into an overall grade of the respective
ESO program. The ESO Grade Index for a certain company j is therefore given by
Gj =
∑5
i=1Gij, with Gj ranging between 5 and 21.
35 While this index is very simple by
32Whether a 1 or 2 (3 or 4) was assigned depends on the precise construction and the institutional design of the respective
program feature. The same applies for the following subindexes if more than one grade per category is stated.
33Hereby, the moneyness of the options at the grant date is taken into account.
34Even though some option programs severely lacked transparency, we were able to access basically all information needed
to assess the option programs in our sample. Being one of the largest fund managers in Germany, Union Investment was
able to exercise considerable power over the companies in the data set such that they finally reported the information that
was required. We cross-checked these answers with publicly available data.
35We are aware that the fact that two subindexes range between 1 and 3 only (while the others range between 1 and 5)
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nature, it has the advantage of being transparent and easily reproducible. In the remainder
of this paper, we call a stock option program “well designed” if the ESO Grade Index Gj
is low (Gj ≤ 11) and “badly designed” if Gj is very high (Gj > 15).
Corporate Governance Data: We use measures from three different areas to capture the
corporate governance structures of firms: (1) ownership variables, (2) board variables,
and (3) legal variables. We employ five measures for the ownership structure of a firm.
To reflect the exposure of a corporation to the U.S. capital market with its demanding
disclosure and governance requirements as well as with its public scrutiny, we use a binary
variable that takes the value 1 if a corporation is listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
and 0 otherwise. Based on the findings presented in Section 2 (e.g. the study by Hartzell
and Starks, 2003), we believe that ownership structures significantly affect the design of
stock option programs. Therefore, we measure whether or not a firm is owned by an en-
tity that holds more than 5% of its capital.36 We also count the number of blockholders
with interests above 5%. Following, for example, Mehran (1995), we calculate the per-
centage of equity that is held by outside blockholders. We therefore add the percentages
of equity owned by individual investors, institutional investors, corporations, families or
governments that hold more than 5% of the common stock of a firm. Finally, government
ownership is measured by a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the state govern-
ment or a government-owned institution holds a stake larger than 5% in the firm, and 0
otherwise.
We employ five measures for the structure and composition of a firm’s board of directors.
To take into account the heterogeneity in European board systems, we use a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if a firm has a unitarian one-tier system with executive
and non-executive directors on the same board (like in Spain or in the United Kingdom).
Similarly, this dummy takes the value 0 if a corporation is governed by a two-tier system
consisting of a supervisory board on the one hand and an executive board on the other
hand (like in Germany or in the Netherlands).
implies an implicit weighting of the subindexes. However, we believe that this weighting is appropriate from an economic
point of view. We believe that both the participation structures and the transparencies of the ESO programs are relatively
less important for a testing of the rent-extraction hypothesis compared to the remaining three design features. Nevertheless,
we tested whether our results are sensitive to this kind of weighting and found that this is not the case (see Subsection 5.4).
36If equity holdings and voting rights differ, we use a blockholder’s voting rights.
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Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993), among others, argue that larger boards of
directors are less effective as monitors than smaller boards. Supporting this argument, re-
cent empirical evidence suggests that small boards of directors perform better monitoring
and are associated with better decisions and superior firm performance (see, e.g., Yermack,
1996, Eisenberg et al., 1998 and Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). We therefore also study
the size of a firm’s board and its association with the ESO design. We measure board size
as the total number of directors on the board of directors (one-tier system)/supervisory
board (two-tier system). Recent discussions on corporate governance schemes in Europe
stress the importance of independent outside directors for the functioning of an effective
governance in firms. In this vein, several studies show that firms with a higher fraction of
outsiders make better decisions on issues like executive compensation, CEO turnover or
corporate acquisition. (see, e.g. Core et al., 1999, Borokhovich et al., 1996 or Weisbach,
1988).37 To account for effects due to independent outside directors, we use a variable that
is defined as the ratio of independent outside directors to the total number of directors.
We define outside directors as members of the board that are neither executives, retired
executives, former executives, employees nor union activists.
Core et al. (1999) argue that “... outside directors may become less effective as they grow
older or serve on ‘too many’ boards.”38 Following this conjecture and following other
researchers in the field, we ascertain the age of the chairman as well as the number of
companies where he is also serving on the board.
A third set of corporate governance variables tries to capture differences in the legal
systems as well as in creditor rights (how strong bondholders and banks are protected)
among the various European countries. We employ four dummy variables, one to account
that a firm is incorporated in a country with English-origin law (e.g. the United Kingdom),
one for a French-origin law country (e.g. France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain), one for
a German-origin law country (e.g. Germany and Switzerland), and one for a Scandinavian
law country. We use the classification reported in La Porta et al. (1998) as our data source.
To measure creditor rights, we also employ the data from La Porta et al. (1998). They use
37Nevertheless, there seems to be no association between the fraction of outside directors and firm performance, see
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) for a survey on this literature.
38Core et al. (1999), p. 383.
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an index that is the result of an aggregation of various different creditor rights and that
ranges between zero and four. A higher number of the index is associated with stronger
creditor rights in a certain country.
Table 1 summarizes the set of governance variables we use in our subsequent analysis.
Control Variables: Control variables used to estimate equation (1) are firm size, leverage,
growth opportunities, business risk, and past stock returns. The proxy for firm size is the
log of the book value of total assets. Leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt to
total assets. Consistent with the literature, our proxy for growth opportunities is Tobin’s
Q. Tobin’s Q is the market value of a firm’s securities divided by the replacement costs
of its tangible assets. We use the Chung and Pruitt (1994) measure, i.e. the market value
of equity, long-term debt, short-term debt, and preferred stock divided by total assets.
Following Mehran (1995), we measure business risk by the standard deviation of the
percentage change of operating income (sales minus total operating expenses). The latter
is measured with annual data ranging from 1998-2003. Stock Return is the annual stock
market return over the past five years (in percent). Moreover, we control for industry
effects using dummies for the sectors energy, retail, manufacturing, and financial services.
4.3 Methodology
Our null hypothesis is that firms with weak governance structures have poorly designed
stock option programs. We use ordered response models to test this hypothesis (ordered
logit and probit models).39 The ordered response is a discrete ordered outcome and given
by our ESO Grade Index Gj. Ordered response models are used to exploit the ordinal and
ordered character of the index data. The fact that an ESO Grade Index of 15 is worse
than an ESO Grade Index of 14 conveys valuable information that we want to make use
of.40 A linear regression assumes that the index categories are equally spaced and treats
the difference between, say, 13 and 12 identically to the difference between, say, 12 and
11. However, the index realizations in our set-up provide only an ordinal ranking without
39See, for example, Wooldridge (2002) or Borooah (2002).
40As discussed in Borooah (2002), not treating a variable as ordered, when in fact it is ordered, can lead to a loss in
efficiency.
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cardinal saying (see Borooah, 2002). As linear models are generally easier to interpret
than ordered response models and as they give good estimates of the average effects,
we also run linear regressions for comparison (see Papke, 1998).41 We use our corporate
governance variables as well as the firm controls as independent variables.
An interpretation of our estimation results has to take into account the possibility that
corporate governance structures (like ownership concentration or board outsiders) as well
as the design of managerial compensation arise simultaneously and endogenously, and
depend on firm characteristics only (see Core et al., 1999 or Hartzell and Starks, 2003 for
further discussion). In an optimal contracting framework (equilibrium perspective), one
should therefore not expect any causal relationship between governance mechanisms and
the design of stock option plans. In this view, both elements are set optimally to maxi-
mize shareholder value. Moreover, both are determined by factors such as the operating or
informational environment of firms. In an out-of-equilibrium environment, however, both
aspects can be related in a way that is consistent with managerial self-dealing. Given that
increasing empirical evidence suggests that executive compensation is better described
by an out-of-equilibrium perspective, we follow the literature and also assume that com-
pensation practices rather follow this second view (see, e.g, Ryan and Wiggins, 2004 or
Dittmann and Maug, 2004).
If we observe that firms with weak corporate governance structures have poorly-designed
stock option programs, there can therefore be two theoretical explanations: (i) there is no
need for high-powered stock option programs and strong governance schemes as agency
costs are low (equilibrium view) or, alternatively, (ii) managers exploit weak governance
structures and missing monitoring devices for self-dealing (out-of-equilibrium view, which
is consistent with our null hypothesis).42 Having these general potential methodological
difficulties in mind, we are careful with an interpretation our results and with any at-
tempts to infer causalities out of our findings. We rather concentrate on studying whether
empirical regularities between governance structures and the design of option programs
exist in our data set and consequently hesitate to draw causal conclusions.
41Using a linear model is rather unproblematic, given that our ordered response can vary between 5 and 21.
42Correspondingly, firms with well-designed ESO programs might not experience the need for alternative governance
mechanisms (like monitoring by boards or blockholders) to maximize firm value.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Firm Characteristics
This table provides summary statistics on the firms that are included in our data set. The data was obtained
from Datastream. Market capitalization is the market value of equity at the end of the year. Sales represents
gross sales less discounts for industrial firms, and total operating revenue for financial firms. Total assets is
the sum of total assets, long term receivables, investments, plant, equipment and other assets. Bank loans and
security holdings are also included. Leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. Tobin’s Q is
the market value of a firm’s securities relative to the replacement costs of its tangible assets. We use the Chung
and Pruitt (1994) measure, i.e. the market value of equity, long-term debt, short-term debt, and preferred stock
divided by total assets. EBITDA is earnings before interest expenses, income taxes and depreciation. Business
Risk is measured by the standard deviation of the percentage change of operating income (sales minus total
operating expenses) and is measured with annual data from 1998-2003. Stock Return is the annual percentage
stock market return for the prior five years. The year of observation is 2003.
Firm characteristics
Variable Mean Median Min. Max. Std.dev.
Market capitalization (million Euro) 33,810 28,301 3,536 136,478 27,537
Sales (million Euro) 34,829 28,991 1,514 141,343 27,900
Total Assets (million Euro) 180,511 53,126 2,453 896,487 250,108
Leverage 0.2588 0.2618 0.0051 0.5333 0.1419
Tobin’s Q 1.1207 0.7802 0.0793 6.7721 1.0984
EBITDA (million Euro) 5,823 4,982 -444 22,645 4,690
Business Risk 181.86 52.98 4.39 2.709 408
Stock Return 3.7790 2.6237 -55.4347 87.7419 17.5508
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Sample Characteristics
Summary statistics for a set of characteristics of the firms in our sample are presented in
Table 2. The year of observation is 2003. The data was obtained from Datastream. Market
capitalization is the market value of equity at the end of the year. The mean (median)
market capitalization is approximately 33.8 billion Euro (28.3 billion Euro). The average
value of the firms’ sales is about 34.8 billion Euro (median 29.0 billion Euro), with a
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maximum of 141.3 billion Euro. Sales represents gross sales less discounts for industrial
firms, and total operating revenue for financial firms. The mean (median) value of the
sample firms’ total assets is 180.5 billion Euro (53.1 billion Euro). Leverage is measured
as the ratio of total debt to total assets. The mean (median) leverage is 0.2588 (0.2618),
and the mean (median) value of Tobin’s Q is 1.1207 (0.7802). Firms generated positive
cash flows on average, with a mean (median) value of EBITDA equal to approximately
5.8 billion Euro (5.0 billion Euro), and a minimum (maximum) of -444 million Euro
(22,6 billion Euro). EBITDA is defined as earnings before interest expenses, income taxes
and depreciation. Business Risk is measured as defined above and based on annual data
from 1998-2003. The mean (median) value of our business risk measure is 181.86 (52.98).
Finally, the mean (median) stock price performance over the five year horizon was about
3.78% (2.62%) p.a. All currencies were transferred into Euro on the basis of year-end
exchange rates.
5.2 Governance Structures and Stock Option Design: Descriptive Results
Descriptive statistics of our corporate governance variables are presented in Table 3. About
61% of the companies in the sample have either common stocks or American Depository
Receipts (ADR) that are traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Large investors play
an important role in our data set. Approximately 65% of all firms have a blockholder that
owns more than 5% of a firm’s voting rights. This figure is mainly driven by German,
French, and Italian firms. The mean (median) number of blockholders that own more than
5% is 1.1707 (1.0000), with a maximum of 7 individual blockholders in one corporation.
Ownership structures are not widely dispersed compared to the U.S., with 18.80% of
the equity being held by investors that own more than 5% of the respective firms’ capital
(median 12.20%). Not surprisingly, national governments still play a significant role in our
sample corporations, with 14.63% of the firms having the state or a government-dependent
institution as a significant shareholder owning more than 5%.
One-tier and two-tier board systems are about equally distributed with approximately
48% of the firms having a one-tier system. Note that French corporations have the choice
between an Anglo-American style one-tier system and a German style two-tier system
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Governance Variables
This table provides summary statistics of the corporate governance variables used in our empirical analysis.
The corporate governance data was obtained from 20-F filings and from proxy statements. For a description
of the variables, see Table 2. The year of observation is 2003 and the sample consists of 82 firms.
Panel A: Ownership variables
Variable Mean Median Min. Max. Std.dev.
Listing NYSE (0/1) 0.6098
Outside blockholder owns >5% (0/1) 0.6463
Number of outside blockholders >5% 1.1707 1.0000 0.0000 7.0000 1.2650
Sum percentages outside blockholders >5% 18.80 12.20 0.00 83.01 21.77
Government ownership (0/1) 0.1463
Panel B : Board variables
Variable Mean Median Min. Max. Std.dev.
Board structure (0/1) 0.4756
Board size 13.63 13.00 0.00 22.00 4.79
Outside directors 0.6867 0.7000 0.2500 1.0000 0.2113
Age chairman 62.85 63.00 48.00 79.00 5.52
Busy chairman 3.59 3.00 0.00 9.00 2.43
Panel C : Legal variables
Variable Mean Median Min. Max. Std.dev.
French law country (0/1) 0.4146
English law country (0/1) 0.1707
German law country (0/1) 0.4042
Scandinavian law country (0/1) 0.0122
Creditor rights 2.1951 2.5000 0.00 4.00 1.3648
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(which has been adopted by some firms).43 The average board consists of 13.63 directors,
a figure that is close to the one reported in Core et al. (1999). Board size, however, varies
widely with the largest board consisting of 22 directors. On average, boards have about
69% outside directors, ranging from only 25% to 100%. Our figures on board indepen-
dence reflect recent attempts in Europe to strengthen governance structures by following
suggestions made by various national governance committees to increase the number of
independent directors.44 The oldest chairman in our data set is 79 years old, whereas the
mean and median age is about 63 years. On average, chairmen serve on 3.59 additional
boards of directors/supervisory boards. Again, the numbers vary widely across the firms
(between 0 and 9 additional supervisory mandates).
17.07% of the firms are incorporated in a country with English-common-law origin,
41.46% with French-civil-law origin, 40.24% with German-civil-law origin, and 1.22% with
Scandinavian-law origin. The mean (median) value for our measure of creditor rights is
about 2.20 (2.50).45
Table 4 gives summary statistics for the ESO Grade Index Gj and the 5 subindexes. Recall
that Gj is the sum of the 5 subindexes and that the index has a possible range from 5
to 21. Panel A shows that the mean (median) value of the index is 14.38 (14.00). The
company with the option program that is most consistent with economic recommendations
has an index value of 8, which is only slightly above the best possible value. Panel A
also shows that the highest ESO Grade in our data set is 21. Panel B documents that
the sample companies show a very large variation in the design of their stock option
programs. If we define a stock option program as being “well designed” if Gj is low (Gj
≤ 11) and as “badly designed” if it is very high (Gj > 15), than only about 27% of the
programs can be considered as being “well designed”. But on the other hand, around 44%
of the programs have to be regarded as being non-satisfactory (“badly designed”) as their
program features are not consistent with economic recommendations. Interestingly, Panel
C of Table 4 gives summary statistics for the five subindexes. Recall that the subindexes
43French firms have the choice between the traditional unitarian system based on the powerful Pre´sident Directeur
Ge´ne´rale (PDG) and, alternatively, a two-tier system with both a supervisory board and an executive board.
44Examples are the Vie´not Committee in France, the Draghi Commission in Italy or the Regierungskommission Deutscher
Corporate Governance Kodex in Germany.
45See La Porta et al. (1998) for comparison and for a detailed definition of the variable.
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Table 4: ESO Program Index and Subindexes: Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics of the ESO Grade Index that is used in our empirical analysis. The
sample consists of 82 firms. The program data is based on 20-F filings and a mail survey conducted by Union
Investment. The year of observation is 2003. For definitions, see Subsection 4.1.
Panel A:
ESO Grade Index Gj : Summary Statitics
Mean 14.38 Median 14.00
Min 8.00 Max 21.00
Std.dev. 3.50 Obs. 82
Panel B :
ESO Grade Index Gj : Distribution
Realization Freq. Percent Cum.
5 < Gj ≤ 7 0 0.0000 0.0000
7 < Gj ≤ 9 5 0.0610 0.0610
9 < Gj ≤ 11 17 0.2074 0.2683
11 < Gj ≤ 13 14 0.1707 0.4390
13 < Gj ≤ 15 10 0.1220 0.5610
15 < Gj ≤ 17 17 0.2073 0.7683
17 < Gj ≤ 19 14 0.1707 0.9390
19 < Gj ≤ 21 5 0.0610 1.0000
Panel C :
Subindexes: Summary Statistics
Subindex Mean Median Std.dev Min. Max.
Relative Performance Target 3.48 4.00 1.48 1.00 5.00
Absolute Performance Target 4.46 5.00 0.84 1.00 5.00
Accounting 3.09 3.00 1.63 1.00 5.00
Participation Structure 1.66 2.00 0.71 1.00 3.00
Transparency 1.70 2.00 0.75 1.00 3.00
Panel D :
Subindexes: Frequency of realizations
Subindex 1 2 3 4 5
Relative Performance Target 11 14 14 11 32
Percent 13.41 17.07 17.07 13.41 39.02
Absolute Performance Target 2 0 12 12 56
Percent 2.44 0.00 14.63 14.63 68.29
Accounting 22 13 9 12 26
Percent 26.83 15.85 10.98 14.63 31.71
Participation Structure 39 32 11 - -
Percent 47.56 39.02 13.41 - -
Transparency 39 29 14 - -
Percent 47.56 35.37 17.07 - -
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Relative Performance Target, Absolute Performance Target and Accounting range from
1 to 5, while Participation Structure and Transparency range from 1 to 3 only. Panel
C documents that the absolute performance targets of firms are much less ambitious
than their relative ones (mean values of 4.46 and 3.48, respectively). The median firm
discloses the costs of its ESO programs in the footnotes only. More information on the
exact distribution of the grades for the subindexes are provided in Panel D. It shows, for
example, that only 22 companies (26.83%) use a fair value accounting approach to expense
the costs of their stock options, while 26 firms (31.71%) do not disclose or expense ESO
costs at all. Astonishingly, 68.29% of all firms have absolute performance targets that
require annual stock price increases of below 2%.46
Table 5 shows examples of the ESO design features of six selected companies (including the
values for the five subindexes as well as for each overall ESO Grade Index Gj; summaries
only).
Spearman correlation coefficients between the five subindexes as well as the significance
level of each correlation coefficient (in parentheses) and the number of observations used
in calculating the coefficient are presented in Table 6. Among other things, it shows that
firms with low relative performance targets generally have broad-based ESO programs.
Transparency is significantly associated with better relative performance targets, better
accounting practices and more focused participation structures. The table also shows that
firms with high relative benchmarks typically do not seem to simultaneously employ high
absolute performance targets.
The question that remains to be answered after this section is whether the drastic variation
in ESO designs is significantly associated with differences in governance structures. In the
next subsection, we investigate this issue in more depth. We study whether firms with
poorly designed stock option programs show identifying characteristics with respect to
their governance structures.
46See Winter (2002a,b) for a descriptive study on performance targets of ESO programs in Germany. Buck et al. (2004)
document case studies on the the design of stock option programs in Germany and the UK.
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5.3 Governance Structures and Stock Option Design: Regression Results
The association between corporate governance structures and the stock option design is
examined using cross-sectional ordered response models (see Section 4). The regression
includes the ESO Grade Index Gj as the ordered response, and corporate governance as
well as control variables as regressor. Regression results for an ordered logit, an ordered
probit and, for comparison, for a linear regression model are presented in Table 7. For
expositional clarity, law and industry dummies are not reported in this table.47 They all
turned out to be insignificant. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.48
The regression results show that firms that are listed on the New York Stock Exchange
employ stock option programs that are better designed on average. Thus, European com-
panies that are exposed to the U.S. capital market seem to provide less rent-extraction
and self-dealing opportunities to their managers (when option programs are considered).
This result is certainly due, at least in part, to the public scrutiny and the disclosure re-
quirements that result from listings on the New York Stock Exchange (e.g. by the SEC).
Furthermore, we find a negative and significant relation between our measure of the per-
centage of equity held by blockholders and Gj. That is, firms with a higher fraction of
blockholders have better designed stock option programs on average. This finding supports
the view that controlling shareholders are important in monitoring managerial compensa-
tion and behavior. They seem to put pressure on the management in a way that prevents
self-dealing with poorly designed ESO programs. Our evidence on the role of blockholders
in exercising corporate governance complements evidence of other studies in the field.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Franks and Mayer (2001), Shivdasani (1993) and others also
document that large shareholders play an active role in corporate governance.49 With
respect to the more specific issue of executive compensation, our finding is in line with
results showing that ownership structures and executive compensation are related in a
47We excluded the number of blockholders that own more than 5% as well as the dummy indicating whether a blockholder
is present or not from our regression analysis. We catched the effects of these variables by using the percentage of blockholders
that own more than 5%.
48Note that the magnitudes of coefficients in ordered response models do not have a simple interpretation. See, for
example, Wooldridge (2002).
49For further evidence, see Becht et al. (2003) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003).
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way that better governance structures are associated with higher pay-performance sensi-
tivities and lower managerial compensation (see, e.g., Hartzell and Starks, 2003, Lambert
et al. (1993) or Core et al., 1999).
The coefficients for government ownership and board structure turned out to be insignif-
icant, suggesting that state ownership and the general board structure (one-tier vs. two-
tier) are not systematically related with the corporate stock option design.
Our board variables provide a less clear cut picture. If board sizes increase, we typically
expect that boards have greater coordination problems and hence perform monitoring
less effectively. In the case of ESO programs, this would suggest that executives exploit
these circumstances by influencing their stock option pay in the way that incentive effects
and the overall ESO design become less ambitious. Contrary to this conjecture, we find
that firms with larger boards more often have well designed stock option programs. The
coefficient of board size is negative and significant in both ordered response specifications
as well as in the linear regression model.
Consistent with the rent-extraction view, we find a significant association between the
fraction of outsiders on the board and the design of the ESO programs. More specifically,
our evidence suggests that a higher percentage of outsiders is generally associated with
better ESO programs. This result is similar to the conclusions in Core et al. (1999), Chance
et al. (2000), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), and related papers that document the
ability of executives to influence compensation packages through their ability to influence
non-independent inside directors. Consequently, we have strong evidence suggesting that
board composition of firms is not only of symbolic but rather of economic importance.
Surprisingly, we find that the design of option programs is better in firms where the
chairman serves on a larger number of other boards.
Further support for the view that governance structures and managerial self-dealing are
related is provided by the coefficient of our creditor rights variable. We find that firms
with greater creditor rights employ ESO programs that are more consistent with economic
recommendations. Strong creditor rights therefore seem to limit the opportunistic behavior
of managers regarding the design of their option programs.50
50Note that rent-extraction can have a significant impact on creditors.
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Table 7: Relationship between ESO Program Index and Corporate Governance Variables:
Ordered Response and Linear Regression Models
This table shows estimates of ordered response models (ordered logit and probit). The ordered response is
the ESO Grade Index Gj . Definitions of the explanatory governance variables are presented in Table 1. As
controls, we use firm size, leverage, Tobin’s Q, business risk, the past stock return, and industry dummies.
For expositional clarity, the law and industry dummies are not reported in this table. They all turned out
to be insignificant. We excluded the number of blockholders that own more than 5% as well as the dummy
indicating whether a blockholder is present or not from our regression analysis. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. To simplify interpretation, we also present estimation results from a linear regression. * indicates
significance at 10%; ** indicates significance at 5%; *** indicates significance at 1%.
Dependent variable: ESO Grade Index Gj Ordered Logit Ordered Probit Linear Regression
Independent Variables Coef. t-statistics Coef. t-statistics Coef. t-statistics
Listing NYSE -1.067 (-2.02)** -0.567 (-1.88)* -1.282 (-1.62)
Log(Sum perc.outside blockh. > 5%) -4.212 (-2.43)** -2.306 (-2.31)** -4.440 (-1.72)*
Government ownership 1.141 (1.54) 0.582 (1.32) 1.167 (1.01)
Board structure 1.023 (1.38) 0.631 (1.36) 1.542 (1.26)
Board size -0.237 (-3.13)*** -0.124 (-2.77)*** -0.258 (-2.24)**
Outside directors -3.476 (-1.84)* -2.092 (-1.93)* -3.971 (-1.41)
Age chairman -0.054 (-1.04) -0.017 (-0.61) -0.071 (-0.96)
Busy chairman -0.264 (-2.17)** -0.116 (-1.74)* -0.261 (-1.50)
Creditor rights -0.944 (-2.62)*** -0.478 (-2.34)** -0.934 (-1.78)*
Size 0.178 (0.25) 0.164 (0.41) 0.465 (0.44)
Leverage 0.236 (0.14) -0.144 (-0.14) -0.116 (-0.04)
Tobin’s Q 0.765 (2.66)*** 0.461 (2.81)*** 1.109 (2.61)**
Business Risk 0.001 (1.71)* 0.000 (2.00)** 0.002 (1.93)*
Stock Return -0.038 (-1.91)* -0.021 (-2.20)** -0.048 (-1.92)*
Pseudo R2 0.1625 0.1543
Adjusted R2 0.3920
LR χ2(23) 64.58 61.33
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000
Prob > F 0.000130
The estimation results moreover show that the design of a firm’s stock option program is
cross-sectionally related to a company’s growth opportunities (as proxied by Tobin’s Q),
its business risk (as proxied by the standard deviation of the percentage change of oper-
ating income), and its past stock market return. Firms with higher growth opportunities
and with a higher business risk have programs that are more poorly designed on average.
This finding might reflect that high volatility companies with many growth opportunities
need to offer broad-based ESO programs that are likely to be in-the-money to attract high
quality managerial talent. Core et al. (1999) provide a similar argument to interpret their
finding that firms with higher investment opportunities pay higher CEO compensation.
The coefficient of Stock return is negative and significant showing that firms with a high
annual stock market return over the past five years generally have better designed ESO
plans. The coefficients on firm size (proxied by the log of total assets) and leverage turned
out to be statistically insignificant.
In terms of overall performance of our econometric models, our regression results indicate
that corporate governance variables together with our controls have significant power in
explaining the observed variation in the design of ESO plans (pseudo R2 of 16.25% and
15.43% respectively, and Prob > χ2 = 0.0000 for both ordered response models).51
Overall, our results provide strong evidence on the view that poor governance schemes are
generally associated with badly designed stock option programs. We find that ownership
structures are related to the ESO design in a way that is consistent with the manage-
rial power/rent-extraction view. The significant signs of the variables that capture the
influence of blockholders and the NYSE listing confirm the view that when governance
systems are weak, executives can extract rents by designing poor ESO programs. Further
support for this perspective is provided by the finding that weak creditor rights are corre-
lated with poorly designed stock option plans. Our results further suggest that the board
composition is also related to the ESO design in a way that supports the arguments of
the managerial power view. However, our measure of board size is negatively related to
the ESO Grade Index which is contrary to the hypthesis that larger boards provide more
opportunities for managers to extract rents. It is also contrary to many recent findings
suggesting that larger boards monitor less effectively.
51Note that a pseudo R2 of around 16% is relatively high for these kind of estimation models.
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In summary, we can conclude that we have found evidence supporting our null hypothesis
which says that firms with weaker governance structures have worse designed stock option
programs.
5.4 Robustness Checks
We performed several checks to test the robustness of our results. In particular, we studied
whether our findings are robust to the exclusion of the absolute performance target,
and whether the implicit under-weighting of the participation structure and transparency
grade have a significant impact on our results.
We argued that an evaluation of the presence and design of absolute performance targets
might not be justified from an agency theoretic point of view. However, we included this
design feature in our analysis because of the arguments presented in Section 3. In this sub-
section, we provide regression results that were obtained when we excluded the absolute
performance target from our calculation of the overall ESO Grade Index Gj.
52 Thus, the
resulting new ESO Grade Index Gmodj now ranges between 4 and 16. Regression results
using this modified index are presented in Table 8. Again, law and industry dummies are
not reported in this table. Apart from the retail dummy (significant at the 10%-level;
positive sign), they all turned out to be statistically insignificant again.
Overall, the figures in Table 8 show that our results are robust to the exclusion of a
subindex that evaluates the absolute performance target of a certain ESO plan: the re-
gression results again document that firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange have
stock option programs that are better designed on average. Moreover, we still find a neg-
ative and significant relation between our measure of the percentage of equity held by
blockholders and the ESO Grade Index Gmodj . We find further evidence suggesting that
ineffective board compositions (few outsiders only) are associated with badly designed
ESO plans. Our conclusions made in the previous subsections therefore hold independent
of the inclusion of a grade for an absolute performance target.
To account for the possibility that the implicit but deliberate under-weighting of the
52Thus, the ESO Grade Index was calculated on the basis of the following four subindexes: Relative Performance Target,
Accounting, Participation Structure, and Transparency.
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Table 8: Relationship between the Modified ESO Program Index and Corporate Governance
Variables: Ordered Response and Linear Regression Models
This table shows estimates of ordered response models (ordered logit and probit). The ordered response is
the modified ESO Grade Index Gmodj (exclusion of absolute performance target). Explanatory governance
variables are listed in Table 1. As controls, we use firm size, leverage, Tobin’s Q, business risk, the past stock
return, and industry dummies. For expositional clarity, the law and industry dummies are not reported in
this table. To simplify interpretation, we also present estimation results from a linear regression. t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10%; ** indicates significance at 5%; *** indicates
significance at 1%.
Dependent variable: ESO Grade Index Gj Ordered Logit Ordered Probit Linear Regression
Independent Variables Coef. t-statistics Coef. t-statistics Coef. t-statistics
Listing NYSE -1.133 (-2.11)** -0.570 (-1.89)* -1.205 (1.66)
Log(Sum perc.outside blockh. > 5%) -4.058 (-2.31)** -2.231 (-2.22)** -4.223 (-1.78)*
Government ownership 1.180 (1.56) 0.689 (1.54) 1.259 (1.18)
Board structure 1.503 (2.01)* 0.884 (1.89)* 1.914 (1.70)*
Board size -0.211 (-2.75)*** -0.112 (-2.51)** -0.229 (-2.16)**
Outside directors -4.077 (-2.10)** -2.157 (-1.97)** –4.286 (-1.65)
Age chairman -0.044 (-0.87) -0.028 (-0.99) -0.077 (-1-13)
Busy chairman -0.280 (-2.31)** -0.144 (-2.15)** -0.285 (-1.78)*
Creditor rights -0.863 (-2.39)** -0.449 (-2.20)** -0.819 (-1.70)*
Size 0.614 (0.86) 0.421 (1.03) 0.881 (0.90)
Leverage 0.673 (0.39) 0.218 (0.21) 0.319 (0.13)
Tobin’s Q 0.732 (2.45)** 0.425 (2.59)*** 0.965 (2.47)**
Business Risk 0.001 (1.63) 0.001 (1.64) 0.001 (1.75)*
Stock Return -0.040 (-2.02)** -0.022 (-2.29)** -0.047 (-2.04)**
Pseudo R2 0.1666 0.1665
Adjusted R2 0.4000
LR χ2(23) 64.24 64.17
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000
Prob > F 0.0001
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subindexes for Participation Structure and Transparency has an impact on our results,
we also performed regressions where all five indexes where measured on a one to five
scale.53 Again, we employed models using the same set of explanatory variables as in the
previous sections. We thereby find that our regression results (not reported here) do not
change and are hence not sensitive to the fact that two subindexes are measured on a 1
to 3 scale only.
6 Conclusion
Various features of existing stock option programs have been heavily criticized by share-
holder activists and institutional investors. It is argued that the design of many stock
option programs is an example of rent-extraction and managerial self-dealing, and illus-
trates the inability of existing corporate governance mechanisms in monitoring executives.
There is also increasing criticism by academic scholars which argue that both the escala-
tion and the design of stock option compensation reflect managerial rent-seeking rather
than optimal contracting (see Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004 and Bebchuk et al., 2002).
Based on these critical views, we investigated empirically whether there really exists an as-
sociation between the design of employee stock option programs and corporate governance
structures. We tried to explain the observed variation in the design of ESO programs with
differences in governance schemes. Simply put, we examined whether firms with weak cor-
porate governance have stock option programs that are poorly designed from an economic
point of view.
To perform this task, data on European stock option programs provided a promising basis.
Compared to stock option plans in the U.S., European programs show much larger varia-
tion. They therefore provide a natural environment for an attempt to test the managerial
power approach. We analyzed the association between the stock option design and cor-
porate governance structures using detailed data on the option programs of corporations
belonging to the DAX 30, the Euro Stoxx 50, and the Stoxx 50. Our main results can be
summarized as follows. We found that cross-sectionally, ownership variables are related
53Recall that each of these two subindexes ranges from 1 to 3 only, while the others range from 1 to 5. We therefore assigned
the values 1, 3 and 5 instead of 1, 2 and 3 to the realizations of the variables Participation Structure and Transparency.
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to the ESO design in a way that is consistent with the managerial power/rent-extraction
view. When ownership concentration is low and the exposition to the U.S. capital market
little, executives extract rents by designing poor ESO programs. Further support for this
view is provided by the finding that firms with weaker creditor rights more often have
badly designed stock option plans. Our findings further suggest that ineffective board
structures (insider-dominated boards) are related to the stock option design in a way that
supports the arguments and predictions of the self-dealing view: firms with few outsiders
have worse programs on average. We therefore extended the existing literature by explic-
itly showing the importance of corporate governance structures for an explanation of the
variation in the design of stock option programs.
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